Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a Distributed Generation World by Tomain, Joseph P.
Nova Law Review
Volume 38, Issue 3 2014 Article 4
Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a
Distributed Generation World
Joseph P. Tomain∗
∗
Copyright c©2014 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
TRADITIONALLY-STRUCTURED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN A 
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION WORLD 
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 473 
II.  INDUSTRY CHALLENGES ................................................................ 476 
III.  THE NEW NORMAL .......................................................................... 481 
A.  Traditional Economic Assumptions .................................. 482 
B.  Traditional Policy Assumptions ........................................ 484 
C.  Regulatory Changes .......................................................... 485 
IV.  TAKINGS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES ............................................... 491 
V.  A DG TEST CASE ........................................................................... 496 
VI.  THE NEW REGULATORY COMPACT ............................................... 504 
A.  Stranded Costs .................................................................. 505 
B.  Legacy Financing ............................................................. 506 
C.  Innovation & Competition ................................................ 507 
D.  Universal Service & Reliability ........................................ 508 
E.  Mitigation .......................................................................... 509 
VII.  RATEMAKING ................................................................................. 510 
A.  Costs.................................................................................. 512 
B.  Innovation and Transition ................................................. 513 
C.  Balance of Interests .......................................................... 514 
D.  Prudence and Needs Reviews ........................................... 515 
VIII.  NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL.................................................... 515 
IX.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 520 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To hear electric utilities tell the story, the end is nigh.1  Their chief 
worry is symbolized by the simple rooftop solar panel.  Of course, a 
homeowner’s installation of rooftop solar, in and of itself, is little or no cause 
for concern.  After all, property owners have every legal right to generate 
their own power.  Rooftop solar, however, is significant for what it 
                                                 
* Joseph P. Tomain Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of 
Law University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
1. See Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the 
Electric Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. Aug.–Sept. 2012, at 65, 66 [hereinafter Sioshansi, 
Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model]; John Slocum, Threat from 
Behind the Meter, The Case for Utilities to Compete Directly with Distributed Resources, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2013, at 46, 50. 
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represents more broadly—distributed generation (“DG”).2  This broader 
concept of DG means that central power stations can lose market share of 
their electricity sales by a range of technologies including solar, wind, fuel 
cells, micro-grids, and the like.3  Fortunately for electric utilities, at this 
point, distributed solar electricity constitutes only one to two percent of the 
total electricity load and, therefore, DG is not an immediately significant 
contributor to load loss.4  However, the signs on the horizon are not 
necessarily rosy for investor owned electric utilities (“IOUs”) that provide 
seventy-five percent of the nation’s electricity.5 
The reality is that the electricity market is changing.6  The market is 
more competitive today than it has been historically and, consequently, 
traditionally structured IOUs face real financial challenges as new 
technologies with decreasing costs “directly threaten the centralized utility 
model.”7  This article argues that the twenty-first century challenge to the 
                                                 
2. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 69.  DG is also sometimes referred to as distributed energy 
resources—or DER.  ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID:  REALIZING THE 
FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=3002002733. 
3. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 2, at 10. 
4. Id.; see also CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES 22, 26 
(2013) [hereinafter CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES], available at https://
ir.citi.com/HUpLUJZhzhXsP%2b6OiTTARHAGreyfPZR1UG279bla4pIcwvwwMBlSn6clve
Fs%2bcVQPTaKmIi568s%3d; PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES, 
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A 
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf (report prepared for the Edison Electric Institute). 
5. Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory:  Electric Utility Industry 
Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/electricutility_
overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
The [United States] electric industry includes over 3,100 electric utilities.  Investor 
owned electric utilities are privately owned, represent [eight] percent of the total, 
approximately [seventy-five] percent of utility generating capability, generation, 
sales, and revenue.  Historically, most investor owned electric utilities were 
operating companies that provide basic services for the generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity. 
Id. 
6. See, e.g., Charles K. Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Electricity Revolution, 
BROOKINGS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/11/06-
electricity-revolution-ebinger-banks. 
7. KIND, supra note 4, at 3; see also JOHN STERLING ET AL., NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TREATMENT OF SOLAR GENERATION IN ELECTRIC UTILITY 
RESOURCE PLANNING 1, 4 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy1405ti/60047.pdf.  
But see Julie Cart, Solar Power’s Outlook Not as Sunny; Projects Stall Amid Uncertainty 
About the Future of Big Tax Breaks and Utilities’ Willingness to Buy the Pricier Electricity, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at A1.  Cart refers to utility scale solar in the article, which does 
2
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electric industry is different in kind from previous challenges.  Further, past 
responses to past challenges are inadequate to meet the convergence of 
demands posed on IOUs by new technologies, new markets, and new 
regulations.8  Instead, the twenty-first century challenge requires a dramatic 
new response as electric utilities face a new economic order and as they seek 
revenue protection and assurances of financial stability from their regulators. 
Now, what to do?  Two responses are readily available.  Electric 
utilities can either fight or switch.9  The first response is the one given by 
incumbents:  Stay the course, tweak the regulatory system, and continue 
doing business as usual (“BAU”).10  The BAU strategy relies on maintaining 
cost-of-service ratemaking as central to the regulatory compact between 
utilities and regulators.11  The second—and smarter—is that IOUs must 
change their business models in significant—if not dramatic—ways.12  The 
country is making a revolutionary transition to a clean energy economy13 and 
                                                                                                                   
not threaten traditional utilities as does distributed generation but does affect traditional 
transmission.  See id. 
Of the 365 federal solar applications since 2009, just [twenty] plants are 
on track to be built.  Only three large-scale solar facilities have gone online, two in 
California and one in Nevada.  The first auction of public land for solar developers, 
an event once highly anticipated by federal planners, failed to draw a single bid last 
fall. 
Id. 
8. Joseph P. Tomain, Building the iUtility, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2008, at 
28, 29 [hereinafter Tomain, Building the iUtility]. 
9. Michael T. Burr, Turning Energy Inside Out: Amory Lovins on Negawatts, 
Renewables, and Neoclassical Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 28, 31.  Amory 
Lovins expands on these two basic choices: 
There are at least a half-dozen ways an incumbent can respond to such insurgents.  
It can ignore them; fight them; try to tax or block them; finance them; buy them; 
incorporate their products as its own brand[] offering; become an open-source 
integrator for all qualified offerings; or several other possibilities.  But among all 
responses, playing ostrich [is not] a good one. 
Id.  Not surprisingly, incumbents tend to fight.  See, e.g., Perry Sioshansi, Utility of the Future 
or Future of the Utility?, BREAKING ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/11/13/utility-of-the-future-or-future-of-the-utility/?print=1 
(regarding California’s largest gas and electric utilities, “they were rather attached to the status 
quo with all the protections, security, and restrictions that comes with operating as a regulated 
monopoly”). 
10. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 66. 
11. See id. 
12. See, e.g., Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29–30 (arguing 
that electric utilities must change their business model from selling as much electricity as they 
can to selling energy products and services including electricity generated from renewable 
resources and selling energy efficiency). 
13. See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, 2014 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: FACTBOOK 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.bcse.org/factbook/pdfs/2014%20sustainable%20energy%20in%20America%20fa
3
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there are several drivers to that transition, including:  (1) a developing policy 
consensus;14 (2) positive economic indicators;15 (3) the need to diversify fuel 
resources; (4) new financing techniques; and, (5) regulatory proposals at the 
state and federal levels.16  Quite simply, electric utilities should behave as 
key actors in that transition.  Today, however, utility efforts have been 
lacking as they seek solace in old ways of doing business. 
This article will first explore current industry characteristics and 
challenges in Part II.  Part III will then discuss the current situation of the 
electricity market and IOU participation in that market.  Part IV will analyze 
the fundamental legal claim available to utilities that the regulatory 
environment is devaluing their property and may constitute a constitutional 
taking.  In Part V, a test case involving solar distributed generation and net 
metering will be presented to examine the types of challenges facing IOUs as 
well as available responses to those challenges. 
Starting with Part VI, the article more broadly discusses the need to 
change the current regulatory compact between utilities and their regulators.  
Then, Part VII examines new forms of ratemaking that can be employed to 
implement the regulatory compact.  The article concludes in Part VIII with a 
discussion of the shape that the utility of the future ought to take. 
II. INDUSTRY CHALLENGES 
The electricity industry has been roiling for over three decades.  For 
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the industry continued to realize 
growth and, with it, increasing sales and profits.17  Utility executives were 
aided in their expansion by a cost-of-service rate formula that rewarded them 
for their capital investments.18  During that period, as the industry expanded, 
economies of scale were realized and consumers enjoyed relatively low and 
stable prices while producers reaped their rewards.19 
                                                                                                                   
ctbook.pdf (“A revolution is transforming how the [United States] produces, delivers, and 
consumes energy.  The mix of supply is changing rapidly, with low-carbon sources gaining 
share, while consumption is declining, despite overall economic growth.”). 
14. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 92 (2011) [hereinafter TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY]. 
15. See, e.g., Joel Makower, The State of Green Business 2014, 
GREENBIZ.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/01/21/state-green-
business-2014 (discussing growth in clean energy investments). 
16. CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 6. 
17. KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN 
THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 17 (2012), 
available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/COSR_history_
final.pdf. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
4
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By the mid-to-late 1960s, however, things began to change:  A 
national electricity infrastructure was completed; electric generation plants 
reached a technological plateau; and, the cost of electricity from traditionally 
structured electric plants began to rise.20  These events, among others, shook 
the industry from its complacency and presented real challenges both to 
industry actors and to their regulators. 
This once staid industry began encountering a series of challenges 
beginning in the late 1970s as electricity prices began to rise and as the 
financial stability of the industry was threatened by two major events.21  The 
first financial shockwave came with the collapse of commercial nuclear 
power.22  From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, utilities that had invested 
in nuclear power found themselves with excess capacity, canceled plants, or 
the costly conversions of nuclear plants to coal-fired plants.23  These nuclear 
investments ran into the billions of dollars and those costs had to be 
apportioned in some way.24  The question “Who pays?” was a real one for 
utilities, for regulators, and for consumers.  The response to the question was 
generally some form of cost allocation between ratepayers and 
shareholders.25  In some instances, regulators simply amortized the 
investment and allowed the utilities to recover their principal but did not 
allow them to either earn a return on their investment or to recover their costs 
of capital.26  In brief, the regulatory response to the nuclear crisis was to 
                                                 
20. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 11 (1987) 
[hereinafter TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION]. 
21. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in 
Retrospect:  Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 503 (1984). 
22. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–04. 
23. MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–05. 
24. Pierce, supra note 21, at 504. 
25. See TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 3; 
Pierce, supra note 21, at 505–06. 
26. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
810 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  In this case, an en banc panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) ruling that allowed Jersey Central to recover a $397 million 
investment in a failed nuclear power plant over a fifteen-year period.  Id. at 1170–71, 1187–
88.  Jersey Central wanted to place the unamortized portion that remained each year into the 
rate base.  FERC allowed the fifteen-year amortization—i.e., allowed the utility to recover 
$26.4 million as an expense for fifteen years—but disallowed including the unamortized 
portion in the rate base, and that ruling was upheld by the Circuit Court.  Id. at 1171, 1187–88. 
Regulators applied other rules as well.  Some regulators, for example, applied the 
prudent investment test, which held that investments that were prudent when made should be 
recovered from ratepayers.  See United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R. 4th 252, 267 (Conn. Dept.  
Pub. Util. Control Aug. 22, 1983); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 P.U.R. 4th 386, 400 (N.Y. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1982).  And others applied a used and useful test that held that ratepayers 
were not to be saddled with the cost of an investment that produced no electricity.  See 
5
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protect some of a utility’s investment, and to maintain their financial stability 
while not overburdening consumers.27 
The second financial shockwave came in the 1990s with efforts to 
deregulate the electric industry, and when that failed, then to restructure it.28  
Complete deregulation failed due to its complexity and the inability to 
develop either a policy or political consensus to fully deregulate.29  At the 
wholesale level, deregulation looked promising and has occurred to a 
significant degree.30  At the retail level, however, the continued natural 
monopoly characteristics of the transmission and distribution (“T&D”) 
segments prevented across-the-board deregulation from occurring.31  Many 
states, however, did attempt retail competition,32 but California’s notable 
failure threw two major utilities into financial distress with Pacific Gas and 
Electric declaring bankruptcy.33  With that failed experiment, restructuring 
effectively ended.34  Still, restructuring efforts threatened the financial 
integrity of IOUs.35  The regulatory response to this problem, however, was 
to provide some mechanism for utilities to recover any stranded costs that 
resulted from (1) prudent investment and (2) reliance on regulatory 
requirements.36 
The nuclear power collapse and the failure of restructuring were one-
off events.  In other words, once an investment in a nuclear plant was 
unproductive for any of the reasons cited above, then the financially 
threatening event was over and it needed to be resolved in some way.  
Similarly, once an investment in a restructured environment was also seen to 
                                                                                                                   
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989).  In this case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States upheld a Pennsylvania state statute that mandated that only capital 
investments that were used and useful could be recovered through rates.  Id. 
27. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 518. 
28. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 31. 
29. See id. at 36. 
30. See id. at 28, 31. 
31. See id. at 33; Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly 
System, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY:  DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 89, 104 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Joseph 
P. Tomain, Whither Natural Monopoly?  The Case of Electricity, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY:  DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111, 111 
(Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
32. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 413 (2d ed. 2011). 
33. Laura M. Holson, California’s Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A1. 
34. Tomain & Cudahy, supra note 32, at 408. 
35. See Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility 
Industry Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/
electricutility_overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
36. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6, 31. 
6
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be unproductive, then it too needed resolution.  The regulatory responses to 
both events were essentially cost-based.37  Regulators looked to the prudence 
of a utility’s capital investment and they looked to the overall effect of those 
investments on the utility’s financial integrity.38  Regulators then did what 
they could to ensure the continued financial existence of the utilities.39  The 
current challenge, however, is not one-off.  Instead, it is long-term and 
developing slowly, and also requires a more creative response than shoring 
up past investments.40  Instead, a forward-looking response is needed to 
maintain a healthy electric market for IOUs.41 
In order to better understand the nature of the twenty-first century 
challenge, let’s briefly first look at changes in the market and then examine 
some of the reasons for those changes.  The electricity market in the twenty-
first century is dramatically different from what it was during the twentieth 
century.  For most of last century, electric utilities enjoyed a growing market 
and, therefore, regularly enjoyed increasing sales.  Today, however, things 
are different. 
Demand for electricity has slowed each decade from the post-World 
War II golden age until now.42  In the decade of 1949 to 1959, electric 
utilities enjoyed an annual growth of 9.8%.43  That growth has declined to an 
annual rate of 0.7% in the first decade of the twenty-first century.44  In fact, 
electricity demand has declined every year except two since 1996.45  Further, 
for the last two years demand has fallen, and in 2012, demand was down 
1.7% compared with 2011.46  According to recent Energy Information 
                                                 
37. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at viii–ix tbl.1, x, 
17–40.  In addition to nuclear power and restructuring, McDermott notes other periods of 
stress including the rise of inflation during the 1970s, excess capacity in the 1980s, and a 
current challenge to restore customer and investor confidence in the industry.  Id. 
38. Id. at viii, 25–26. 
39. See id. at 33. 
40. See Ebinger & Banks, supra note 6. 
41. See id. 
42. See LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES:  PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 151 (8th ed. 2005).  From 1945 through 1965, electric utilities enjoyed 
an annual growth rate of approximately seven percent.  Id.  “No doubt what helped most was 
the dramatic and continuing drop in the real price of electricity, compared to the price of other 
fuels.”  Id. 
43. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040 71 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2013], available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf. 
44. Id. 
45. Amory B. Lovins, Amory’s Angle:  Three Major Energy Trends to Watch, 
SOLUTIONS J. ONLINE (Summer 2013), http://www.rmi.org/summer_2013_esj_amorys_
angle_three_major_energy_trends_main. 
46. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 2012 STATE OF THE MARKETS 
REPORT 43 (2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/reports-analyses/st-
7
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Administration estimates, demand is scheduled to decline for the third year 
in a row and hit the lowest level since 2001.47  Nevertheless, the Department 
of Energy projects that for the next three decades, from 2011 to 2040, overall 
demand will increase by twenty-eight percent.48  Even with such modest 
growth in overall demand, individual consumers are, in fact, consuming less 
electricity.49  More problematic for traditional IOUs, however, is that 
projected demand for central power station electricity is predicted to fall 
“dramatically due to a combination of energy efficiency and competition 
from new technologies, which collectively could impact their addressable 
markets by 50% over the next two decades.”50  To add to these troubles, 
significant investment is needed in the electricity infrastructure, both to 
upgrade the current grid and to promote interconnections with renewable 
resources, as well as to make investments in new technologies.51 
According to the Energy Information Administration, electricity 
demand declined due to reduced retail sales and a lack of demand growth in 
the commercial and industrial sectors as a result a soft economy.52  A slow 
economy, though, is only one reason among many.  Technological and 
market reasons include increased energy efficiency in appliances and 
buildings; smarter meters and temperature controls; smarter consumer 
choices about using cheaper off-peak energy; growth of DG so that 
consumers can obtain power on-site; and an increase of inexpensive shale 
gas for home heating.53  These technological and market changes, however, 
did not come about on their own.  They were aided by state and federal 
regulations that were intentionally designed to increase competition and 
change the fuel mix in the electricity sector largely because cleaner, cheaper 
                                                                                                                   
mkt-ovr/2012-som-final.pdf; Jonathan Fahey, Home Electricity Use in US Falling to 2001 
Levels, AP (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/home-electricity-use-us-
falling-2001-levels. 
47. Fahey, supra note 46. 
48. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 43, at 
71. 
49. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 12 fig.1.5 
(2012) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011], available at 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.  Energy consumption per capita has 
been relatively flat or declining since roughly 1990.  Id. 
50. JASON CHANNELL ET AL., CITI, ENERGY DARWINISM: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 73–75 (2013), available at https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/
ReportSeries.action?recordId=21. 
51. See New Regulatory Frameworks for Electric Infrastructure Investment, 
EDISON ELECTRIC INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/altreg_
brochure_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
52. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 
note 43, at 71. 
53. See KIND, supra note 4, at 3, 5, 11. 
8
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power was available than that generated by IOUs.54  Further, these regulatory 
demands clearly point to a clean energy future rather than to a continued 
expansion of coal-fired—or even nuclear generated—electricity.55 
III. THE NEW NORMAL 
The constrained electricity market now represents the new normal 
for privately-owned electric utilities.56  This new normal must be recognized 
as different in kind from the threats posed by the nuclear collapse and the 
restructuring failure.  Today’s challenge is structural, long-term, and driven 
by multiple events.  Consequently, to meet the challenge, structural changes 
are necessary on the regulatory side to renegotiate the regulatory compact 
and redesign traditional cost-of-service ratemaking.57  Additionally, there 
must be structural changes in the business model of utilities as well.  The 
needed regulatory and business model responses presented by the new 
                                                 
54. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at ix–x, 33. 
55. Id. at 35.  Recently, four nuclear reactors—two each in Georgia and South 
Carolina—have been granted combined construction and operating licenses.  See Building 
New Nuclear Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/New-
Nuclear-Energy-Facilities/Building-New-Nuclear-Facilities (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).  
Nevertheless, the economics of high cost nuclear power remain problematic.  See John 
Mecklin, Introduction:  U.S. Nuclear Exit?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 9, 9; The Cost of Nuclear Power:  Numbers That Don’t Add Up, UNION 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-and-our-
energy-choices/nuclear-power-costs/ (last revised Oct. 1, 2013). 
56. See Ahmad Faruqui & Eric Shultz, Demand Growth and the New Normal, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 22, 23.  Demand side management (“DSM”) is comprised of 
“programs and technologies [that] enable consumers to reduce peak demand and electric 
energy consumption by providing customers with incentives to buy more energy efficient 
technologies and to shift demand from peak hours—where the power grid is stressed due to 
high demand—to off-peak hours.”  Id. at 24; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 1–2.  Among the 
factors contributing to the challenge, Kind lists:  (1) falling cost of distributed generation; (2) 
new technologies; (3) consumer and regulator interest in demand side management; (4) 
declining natural gas prices; (5) slow economic growth; (6) rising electricity prices in some 
sections of the country; and (7) investment need for system improvements.  KIND, supra note 
4, at 1–3. 
57. See, e.g., Jim Pierobon, Don’t Hold Your Breath for Any Progress 
Stemming from the Joint Statement by NRDC and EEI, THEENEGERYCOLLECTIVE (Feb. 17, 
2014), http://www.theenergycollective.com/jimpierobon/341816/don-t-hold-your-breath-any-
progress-stemming-joint-statement-nrdc-and-eei. 
[W]e all have to realize that real progress can only be made by state utility 
commissions, many of which seemed unwilling to seriously consider moving 
beyond regulatory compacts in states that for decades have rewarded utilities only, 
or mostly, for selling more kilowatt hours.  Now that electricity demand nationally 
is flattening and may be declining, the time has come for tradition-bound states to 
reengineer the traditional regulatory compact. 
Id. 
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normal electricity market can be uncovered by first examining the economic 
and policy assumptions behind the traditional regulatory model, and then by 
examining the regulatory climate that has significantly contributed to the 
current market. 
A. Traditional Economic Assumptions 
In the early years of utility regulation, the relationship between 
utility and regulator was based upon what—in 1898—the infamous Samuel 
Insull proposed as “a grand bargain in which local electric companies would 
receive exclusive franchise service territories, ‘…coupled with the conditions 
of public control, requiring all charges for services fixed by public bodies to 
be based on cost plus a reasonable profit.’”58  Nearly one hundred years later, 
then Judge Kenneth Starr defined that grand bargain as a regulatory compact 
that has been prevailing since electricity regulation began.59  In short, the 
regulatory compact was indeed a grand bargain for the utility.  As it turns 
out, the regulatory compact also served as something of a bargain to 
consumers and to regulators for most of last century. 
Utilities greatly benefited from the regulatory compact essentially 
because by having been granted an exclusive service territory, utilities could 
block out competition from new entrants simply because they were now 
operating under a government protected monopoly.60  Further, utilities also 
benefitted from a ratemaking formula that operated like a cost-plus contract.  
Utilities would receive all of their reasonably incurred expenses on a dollar-
for-dollar basis and they would be able to earn a return on invested capital.61  
                                                 
58. DAVID MALKIN & PAUL A. CENTOLELLA, RESULTS-BASED REGULATION:  A 
MODERN APPROACH TO MODERNIZE THE GRID 7 (2013), available at http://
www.gedigitalenergy.com/regulation/. 
59. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. 
INST., supra note 17, at 56. 
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a 
particular geographical areacoupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain 
or condemnationis granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive 
regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market.  Each party to 
the compact gets something in the bargain.  As a general rule, utility investors are 
provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely to be attained in the 
unregulated or moderately regulated sector; in turn, ratepayers are afforded universal, 
non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits through political 
control over an economic enterprise.  Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless 
to say, not before us. 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189 (citation omitted). 
60. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii; Electric 
Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry Overview, supra note 5. 
61. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii, 2. 
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While it is inaccurate to say that utilities were guaranteed a profit, in effect 
though, as long as they operated prudently, profit was assured.62  Consumers 
also benefitted to the extent that rates were set at more or less competitive 
levels rather than at monopoly levels.63  Regulators benefited as well because 
as the industry was expanding and as utilities were realizing economies of 
scale, rates stayed relatively flat and in some instances, declined.  In other 
words, rate hearings followed well-established and well understood rules and 
methodologies and the life of a regulator was fairly easy.64 
The regulatory compact was implemented through the application of 
a traditional cost-of-service ratemaking formula that required regulators to 
balance the interests of the utility and its shareholders in earning a reasonable 
return on their investments against the interests of ratepayers in not being 
charged confiscatory or discriminatory rates.65  The balance was intended to 
satisfy the Fifth Amendment constitutional prohibition against takings of 
private property without just compensation.66 
Cost-of-service ratemaking, quite simply, works well in an 
expanding economy.  As long as electric demand continues to grow and as 
long as utilities continue to make technological improvements and achieve 
scale economies, utilities can be rewarded for their prudent capital 
investments and customers do not suffer rate increases due to a “virtuous 
growth cycle in which increasing electricity consumption was viewed as 
synonymous with the public good.”67 
The danger in such a formula, however, should be apparent.  As long 
as utilities received a return on capital expenditures, they had an incentive to 
build.68  Again, during a period of economic expansion and growth in 
electricity demand, building is a necessary and economically valuable 
strategy.  Today, however, the industry is experiencing a “‘paradigm shift’ 
caused by the need for large new capital additions at a time of declining sales 
growth and reduced credit worthiness.”69  If the economy slows or demand 
falls, capital investments may not be economically valuable because the 
                                                 
62. See id. at 6. 
63. See id. at 6, 12. 
64. See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATIONS 6 (1983); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 25. 
65. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; J. GREGORY 
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: 
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 223 
(1997). 
66. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; SIDAK & 
SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222. 
67. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at ix. 
68. See id. 
69. Id. at 41. 
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market is saturated and electricity sales flatten, meaning revenues decline for 
IOUs.  Today, IOUs in fact face just such a slow economy, weak demand, 
and nervous regulators.70 
B. Traditional Policy Assumptions 
Generally, energy policy—more specifically electricity policy—was 
grounded on the central and important idea that the more energy that a 
country produces and consumes, then the more vibrant its economy would 
be.71  Indeed, the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented economic 
growth for the United States as well as any developing country with a robust 
energy infrastructure. 
There are other policy ideas associated with this belief in the direct 
positive relationship between energy and the economy.  First, it is more 
efficient to use cheaper inputs to produce a product such as electricity than 
more expensive ones.72  In this way, then, the electric industry has relied 
predominantly on cheap, but dirty, fossil fuels—particularly coal.73  Second, 
scale economies could be realized through larger plants and greater 
centralization.74  Therefore, the utility industry should capitalize on those 
improvements—to a point.  Parenthetically, this principle was exactly the 
reason that utilities invested in nuclear power—to realize scale economies.  
Unfortunately, that strategy often proved to be quite costly.  Third, as utilities 
moved from local to regional, and, ultimately, to interstate T&D, industry 
regulation similarly moved from municipal to state and then to federal 
authorities.75  In short, the development and the structure of the industry and 
its regulation moved in tandem as industry actors and regulators mimicked 
how each conducted its business, thus reinforcing the traditional energy 
paradigm.76 
As a result of these assumptions, the industry and its regulation 
developed a pattern that exists today and is a pattern that has witnessed the 
investment of trillions of dollars over the century.  Unfortunately, the 
traditionally structured industry and its regulation do not fit with current 
                                                 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at ix, 17. 
72. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 119. 
73. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 358 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain, The Dominant Model of United 
States Energy Policy]. 
74. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 11. 
75. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, supra note 
73, at 356–57. 
76. See id. at 374. 
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economic policy nor are they aligned with contemporary energy policy 
assumptions. 
Most notably, today we have significant reasons to question the 
underlying assumption about the direct relationship between energy and the 
economy.  Most particularly, even though electricity demand is projected to 
increase overall, albeit slowly, individual consumption is declining.77  In 
other words, the traditional belief in the direct linkage between energy and 
the economy is now experiencing a reversal.  Individual consumers can 
continue to enjoy the lifestyles they have while consuming less electricity.  
Further, industrial and commercial, as well as residential, consumers are less 
dependent on the local utility for their electricity.  Additionally, energy 
policy—more specifically electricity policy—is concerned not only with the 
relationship between energy and the economy; it is also concerned about 
environmental consequences and about the energy reliability and national 
security issues in the realm of geopolitics.78 
Consequently, given the dramatic nature of changes in the electricity 
market and in energy policy, it is time to reconsider, reevaluate and redesign 
both the regulatory compact and the traditional approach to ratemaking—
particularly given the changes that have been made in energy regulation—to 
which we now turn. 
C. Regulatory Changes 
The regulatory landscape for the electricity industry and its markets 
has been undergoing dramatic change for over forty years at both the federal 
and state levels.79  It is this regulatory twist that has given IOUs cause for 
concern and it is something that they must now confront. 
Although, as noted above, the electric market began changing in the 
mid-1960s, no major regulatory changes occurred until the passage of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).80  In brief, large 
IOUs seemed to reach a technological plateau in the mid-1960s, yet they had 
committed capital to expansion projects.  In doing so, IOUs overbuilt and, as 
a consequence of the traditional ratemaking formula, they were charging 
customers for that capital expansion.  To inside observers, it was clear that 
cheaper electricity was available but could not get to market because T&D 
                                                 
77. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
78. See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29. 
79. Compare e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012), with Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 
2621). 
80. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. 
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was privately owned by IOUs.  As it turned out, PURPA proved the very 
point that cheaper electricity was available.81 
As economic dislocations occurred in world energy markets and in 
the domestic economy, President Carter proposed, and Congress enacted, the 
National Energy Act82 with the intent of stabilizing domestic energy policy 
and markets.83  PURPA was intended to encourage states to move away from 
electricity rate designs that encouraged consumption and move toward 
marginal cost pricing because it would promote more accurate price signals 
and achieve greater efficiencies.84  In addition, PURPA promoted 
independent power production, co-generation and small power generation.85    
Known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”), these non-utility generators were 
able to produce electricity that was less expensive than electricity generated 
from traditional IOUs and they were more successful than policymakers 
imagined.86  QFs demonstrated that non-utility generation could be delivered 
safely and reliably and, as it turned out, there were more generating facilities, 
sometimes referred to as PURPA-machines, than anticipated.87  
Consequently, it was revealed that cheaper power was available for electric 
markets.88 
QFs had a very attractive economic incentive to generate electricity 
up to the maximum amount allowed under law.89  Not only could QFs 
generate cheaper power for a firm’s own use, any excess power could be sold 
back to the local utility at the “utility’s full avoided costs.”90  The local utility 
                                                 
81. See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2602). 
82. National Energy Act of 1978 was comprised of five major pieces of 
energy legislation:  Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; Natural Gas Policy Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3301); Energy 
Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 
3206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 92). 
83. National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 
Stat. 3206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8201). 
84. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2622). 
85. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210. 
86. See What is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
87. Id.; see Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA:  The Intersection of Competition and 
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L. J. 419, 423 (1995). 
88. See What is a Qualifying Facility?, supra note 86. 
89. Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 
417–18 (1983). 
90. Id. at 404. 
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had to allow access to QFs, and it was obligated to purchase their excess 
electricity at the local utility’s marginal cost of electricity.91  The local utility 
had to pay the cost that it would incur to generate one more kilowatt-hour of 
electricity.92  In other words, the utility had to pay the generator not at the 
prevailing market value, but at the utility’s own higher cost of producing 
electricity.93  Thus, PURPA discovered a new generation market. 
In effect, PURPA set the stage for competition.  Traditionally 
regulated IOUs, following the traditional regulatory structure and rate 
formula, earned favorable rates, but they had overbuilt.94  The excess 
capacity raised utilities’ fixed costs, which had to be recovered from 
ratepayers.95  Consumers were aware of these market developments.96  They 
did not want to pay for higher cost electricity and sought lower-cost 
options.97  While the existence of lower cost electricity did not surprise large 
customers, the market was surprised by how much new non-utility generated 
electricity was available, and how eager new generators were to enter the 
market.  These new unregulated producers were willing to supply the market 
with electricity at prices lower than those charged by incumbent IOUs, and 
they now provide over one-third of the country’s electricity.98 
PURPA opened electricity markets and other state and federal 
legislation entered that arena and expanded competition.99  Under the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, Congress created a category of exempt wholesale 
generators.100  These entities generated electricity to be sold at wholesale, 
and they were exempt from some of the regulatory provisions contained in 
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which was later repealed 
                                                 
91. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, § 
210(a), (d), 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3). 
92. See id. § 210(d). 
93. See id. 
94. Joseph P. Tomain, The iUtility, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY 
PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 223, 231–33 (Alyson C. Flournoy & 
David M. Driesen eds., 2010) [hereinafter Tomain, The iUtility]. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 231. 
97. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at X; Tomain, The 
iUtility, supra note 94, at 226–27. 
98. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA 
FOR DECEMBER 2013 tbl.ES1.B (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/
current-year/february2014.pdf. 
99. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 421, 423–24; see also Energy Efficiency & 
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Metering, GREEN POWER NETWORK http://
apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/netmetering.shtml (last updated May 25, 2011). 
100. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79). 
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by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.101  That repeal was deemed to be a 
significant boost to independent power production because it opened the 
electricity market to a wider variety of business activities.102  Also under the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required electric utilities, under certain 
restrictions, to offer net metering services to electricity consumers.103  To 
date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form 
of net metering.104  Additionally, for over three decades federal tax incentives 
in the form of production tax credits and investment tax credits, among 
others, have spurred production of electricity from renewable resources.105  
Finally, federal regulators, pursuant to enacted legislation, are pursuing 
methods of pollution control.106  Proposed EPA rules will strengthen Clean 
Air Act protections and they will have a negative impact on coal-fired power 
plants.107 
Federal regulation was a boon to independent power production.  
State regulation, however, was more varied and went quite a bit further.  
State regulatory actions that contribute to declining electricity demand 
include demand side management planning requirements; integrated resource 
planning requirements; renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”); and energy 
efficiency standards as well as net metering laws.108  Additionally, in an 
effort to stimulate non-fossil fuel generation, thirty-seven states and the 
                                                 
101. See Michael J. Zimmer, Regulation Under the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 2005, in 3 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.14 (2013). 
102. See id. 
103. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594 
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)).  “Each electric utility shall make available 
upon request net metering service to any electric consumer that the electric utility serves.”  Id.  
The section contains qualifications that allow Public Utility Commissions (“PUCs”) to fashion 
net metering rules:  (1) consumer must be an “eligible on-site generating facility” and (2) that 
electricity “may be used to offset electric energy provided by the electric utility to the electric 
consumer during the applicable billing period.”  Id. 
104. Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra 
note 99. 
105. See Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States:  A 
“Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 172 (2013); Mona L. Hymel, The United 
States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:  The Evidence Supporting Tax 
Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43, 50 (2006). 
106. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007) (holding that the 
EPA does have the authority and the responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
107. See, e.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
New Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (forthcoming Federal Register Publication), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014). 
108. See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–28. 
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District of Columbia have adopted RPS that impose requirements of varying 
strictness on local utilities to sell electricity generated by renewable 
resources.109  These standards vary throughout the country but are comprised 
of essentially two elements.110  First, a resource such as solar, wind, 
hydropower, or geothermal must qualify for inclusion under the terms of the 
RPS.111  Second, a percentage goal and timetable is established for each 
utility to satisfy the requirement.112  RPS programs have a significant impact 
on developing renewable resources over the last decade or so.113 
States have also been involved in an array of other regulations that 
are aimed at having electricity produced by non-utility generators using 
renewable resources.114  Feed-in tariffs, for example, are long-term contracts 
                                                 
109. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, EIA (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have 
Renewable Portfolio Standards], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850; 
Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIREUSA.ORG (Mar. 2013), http://
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
110. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New 
Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107. 
111. See id.; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, supra note 109. 
112. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New 
Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107; Lincoln L. Davies, 
Commentary, Power Forward:  The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 
1342 (2010). 
113. See Davies, supra note 112, at 1383; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most 
States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 109.  One of the open issues 
regarding RPS requirements is whether or not they should be left to the states or that national 
standard should be adopted.  Compare Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1441–43 (2010) [hereinafter Rossi, The Limits of 
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard], and Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy 
Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 361–
64 [hereinafter Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable 
Electricity Requirement], with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.  Because each state has a 
different energy mix and because regions have different energy resources available to them, 
the argument is made that they should be left to the states.  Compare Rossi, The Limits of a 
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky 
Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, supra note 
113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.  However, national standards may 
provide more uniformity and may make trading in renewable energy credits more fluid.  
Compare Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 
1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable 
Electricity Requirement, supra note 113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. 
114. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, ZERO NET ENERGY AND 
THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE: ADAPTING ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7, 9, 11, (2012) [hereinafter ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY 
METERING], available at http:/ /www.rmi.org/Content/Files/RMI_PGE_NEM_ZNE_DER_
Adapting_Utility_Business_Models_for_the_21st__Century.pdf.pdf; U.S. Energy Info. 
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that utilities enter into with renewable resource providers, which enable the 
providers to have an assured income stream enabling them to provide 
renewable energy.115  Energy efficiency standards and zero net building 
standards are intended to reduce consumption by capturing energy 
efficiencies.116  States also have tax credits available that have made the 
installation of photo-voltaic (“PV”) solar and other alternatives more 
affordable for more consumers.117 
Consequently, an array of federal and state legislation has had two 
dramatic consequences for the industry.118  First, competition in the 
electricity market has been encouraged.119  Second, regulations have 
promoted renewable resources and energy efficiency that have had the effect 
of reducing demand for IOU electricity.120  This new regulatory scheme has 
caused a reevaluation of regulation at both ends of the fuel cycle.121  At the 
generation end, we have seen that the market is more competitive than once 
assumed.122  At the consumption end, buyers wanted cheaper electricity.123 
Since the late 1970s we have been trying to restructure the electric 
industry with only partial success.  We continue to struggle with the 
problems of:  (1) getting cheaper electricity to consumers; (2) continuing to 
diversify generation sources; (3) dealing with intermittent sources such as 
wind and solar power; (4) redesigning electricity markets; and (5) 
encouraging traditional IOUs to rethink their business models.  This last 
issue—encouraging traditional IOUs to reformulate their business models—
raises a legal question of constitutional dimension.  To the extent that a 
privately owned firm has invested capital in reliance on government 
regulations, is the firm entitled to compensation when those regulations 
change?  That question will be addressed in the next section and will then be 
followed by the test case for the matter of DG that has been promoted 
                                                                                                                   
Admin., Feed-in Tariff:  A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity 
Technologies, EIA (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
115. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff, supra note 114. 
116. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
11. 
117. See id. at 7, 9. 
118. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 423. 
119. Id. 
120. See CHANNELL ET. AL, supra note 50, at 74–75; Cudahy, supra note 87, at 
423. 
121. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21; Cudahy, supra 
note 87, at 425. 
122. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 425. 
123. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21. 
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through government regulation and that now competes with the IOU market 
share. 
The electricity market is indeed changing.  As the Edison Electric 
Institute—the trade association for IOUs—puts the issue:  “While every 
market-driven business is subject to competitive forces, public policy 
programs that provide for subsidized growth of competing technologies 
and/or participant economic incentives do not provide a level playing field 
upon which generators can compete fairly against new entrants.”124  It is 
important to distinguish between technologically driven changes that result 
in increased competition and competition that results from regulatory 
requirements on incumbent utilities and on regulatory incentives that 
promote new entrants.  It is equally, if not more, important to realize that the 
dividing line between markets and their regulation is fuzzy at best.125 
Edison, thus, is partially correct to distinguish between market-
driven technological change and public policies that promote competition.  
This distinction, though, fails to recognize that the electric industry has been 
a regulated industry and has enjoyed the fruits of that regulation for over a 
century.  In other words, the divide between market changes and government 
regulation is not a particularly neat one.  The fact that the electric industry 
has been the beneficiary of regulation and is now in a posture of contesting 
competition that has come about through regulation reveals that a solution or 
response to the industry’s concerns involves political as well as economic 
considerations. 
IV. TAKINGS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
As noted in Part II, the issue of costs from failed nuclear power 
investments or from failed restructuring investments can also arise as 
regulators adopt rules that increase competition for IOUs.  Each of these 
issues raises the same constitutional question.  Is an IOU entitled to recover 
such costs because of regulations that devalue its property?  In other words, 
has a regulation effectuated a taking of utility property? 
Any legal transition generates economic winners and losers.126  In 
the energy sector, subsidies and financial supports to wind and solar 
providers, for example, reduce their cost of doing business and may open up 
clean energy markets.  Similarly, the under payment of royalties or tax 
incentives and subsidies for fossil fuel companies reduce their cost of doing 
                                                 
124. KIND, supra note 4, at 4. 
125. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: 
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 137 (2014). 
126. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 509, 513–14 (1986). 
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business, thus giving them a competitive advantage over clean energy 
providers.127  In short, any regulation has economic consequences including 
reducing the value of an owner’s property.  It is generally true, though, that 
regulations occur on a regular basis without giving rise to a takings claim.  
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law.”128 
However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has also said, “[t]he 
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a [constitutional] 
taking.”129  Holmes’ Delphic pronouncement would seem to settle the matter 
that a regulation can constitute a taking necessitating just compensation.130  
However, the definition of a taking, let alone a regulatory or a deregulatory 
taking,131 remains unsettled and takings jurisprudence has been seen by the 
Supreme Court of the United States as essentially ad hoc.132  More 
problematically, takings jurisprudence, as a whole, has been said to be in vast 
disarray.133 
Consequently, takings law is best understood on a case-by-case basis 
with three or four general principles.134  First, a court is most likely to find a 
taking when a property owner has suffered a permanent physical invasion of 
                                                 
127. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf 
(while most energy resources receive some financial incentives “tax preferences for fossil 
fuels continued to make up the bulk of all energy-related tax incentives through 2007, 
typically accounting for more than two-thirds of the total cost”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE 
EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 24 (2013), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf (undervaluing royalty payments on 
public lands); David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1 (“[A]n examination of the American tax code indicates that oil 
production is among the most heavily subsidized businesses, with tax breaks available at 
virtually every stage of the exploration and extraction process.”). 
128. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
129. Id. at 415. 
130. Id. 
131. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222–26, 427.  Regulatory 
takings are discussed at 222–26.  Deregulatory takings are discussed at chapter 13. 
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
133. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings:  One 
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012). 
134. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
426 (1982). 
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his or her property.135  Second, a property owner who can demonstrate that a 
regulation deprives him or her of all economically beneficial use of his or her 
property may successfully assert a takings claim.136  Third, a regulatory 
taking may be found when a regulation has frustrated the property owner’s 
investment-backed expectations.137  These three reasons are the standard tests 
developed by the Court for identifying takings.138  There appears, though, 
that a fourth requirement is most often applied.139  Specifically, all of the 
cases just cited deal with real property rather than with the value of a 
corporate enterprise.140  Thus, “major regulatory initiatives rarely require a 
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”141 
Nevertheless, the takings argument is far from fanciful for utilities.  
Indeed, the constitutional requirement that regulators cannot take property 
without just compensation is at the heart of the regulatory compact.  As 
noted by the Supreme Court: 
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a 
return on the value of the property which it employs for the 
convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the 
same time and in the same general part of the country on 
investments [and] other business undertakings which are attended 
by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no 
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in 
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.  The return 
should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under 
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its 
                                                 
135. Id. at 441.  The laying of cable TV lines across an owner’s property is a 
physical occupation of real property and is, therefore, a taking.  Id. at 421–26.  “We affirm the 
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.”  Id. at 441. 
136. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently 
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to 
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, 
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. 
Id. 
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (“The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”). 
138. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
139. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
140. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
141. Epstein, supra note 133, at 101. 
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credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper 
discharge of its public duties.142 
Over ninety years ago, then, the Supreme Court established the principle that 
a public utility is entitled to earn a return on its prudently incurred capital 
investments at a level sufficient for the utility to be financially sound and to 
attract investors.143  The problem for a regulated entity, such as an electric 
utility, is that regulations can affect the value of those investments.144  
Indeed, electric utilities have raised the takings issue in a number of settings:  
Environmental regulations,145 restructuring orders,146 low rates of return,147 
and the like,148 have all generated takings claims.  None, however, have 
resulted in direct monetary damages paid in compensation to a utility 
although financial relief from burdensome regulations has been made 
available as discussed below.149 
Substantive takings jurisprudence appears to provide electric utilities 
grounds for claiming that when a regulation goes too far it then becomes a 
taking.150  Yet, electric utilities’ regulatory takings claims have not been 
                                                 
142. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. 
Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1923). 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 689–90, 693. 
145. See, e.g., Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking Proceeding No. 06-04-009, 2007 WL 2579525 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2007).  The regulatory takings claim that GHG regulations may 
devalue property or cause a sale of the property is denied.  Id.  Indeed, the PUC noted that 
claimant failed to cite “any cases holding that there is a regulatory taking if a pollution control 
requirement causes an owner of a plant to shut it down entirely.”  Id. 
146. See, e.g., Provision of Elec. Servs., 175 P.U.R. 4th 1, Docket No. U-0000-
94-165, 1966 WL 787623 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 26, 1996) (utility’s regulatory takings 
claim that Arizona’s restructuring orders may result in uncompensated stranded costs denied, 
because the rules provided a mechanism for at least some stranded cost recovery). 
147. See PacifiCorp, Case No. PAC-E-10-07, 2011 WL 1525191 (Idaho Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Apr. 18, 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 P.U.R. 4th 401, Case No. 
10-E-0050, 2011 WL 286478 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 24, 2011) (9.3% return on equity 
not a taking even though it was below the rate set by other PUCs for similarly structured 
utilities).  PUC’s decision that the 27% of a transmission line that is not used and useful can 
be excluded from the rate base is not a taking.  PacifiCorp, supra note 147.  The PUC also 
noted that when the line is fully integrated into the system, it will put it into the rate base.  Id. 
148. See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d 19, 23 (Vt. 2000) (takings 
claim denied when the Public Services Board reduced the rate of return from 10.5% to 5.25% 
because of the poor management of the utility). 
149. See id. at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of Elec. Servs., supra note 146; 
Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, supra note 
145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 147. 
150. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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successful.151  In part, the lack of success can be attributed to a narrow 
application of takings doctrine as revealed by the four substantive law 
principles listed above.152 
In addition to a narrow reading of substantive takings law, utilities 
must also confront procedural challenges to the successful assertion of a 
takings claim.153  According to the letter of the law, if property is taken for 
public use then compensation is required.154  However, compensation in the 
form of damages for regulatory takings is rare if not impossible.155  First, if a 
utility asserts that a regulatory taking has occurred as a result of an onerous 
regulation, then the most likely remedy will be an invalidation of the 
regulation, not damages.156  Second, courts are reluctant to award damages if 
a utility asserts a facial claim of an unconstitutional regulation because, most 
often, courts require a showing that actual damage has occurred.157 
There is another subtlety to takings jurisprudence that electric 
utilities must face.  Regulation, for example, may very well reduce, even 
destroy, a valuable portion of electric utility’s property.158  However, before 
a takings claim can be successful, the property as a whole must be evaluated 
and not just portion of it.159  A utility, for example, that argues that a portion 
of its property was denied a return on investment, cannot successfully claim 
that a portion of its property has been taken if, looking at the utility’s total 
financial situation, the utility’s property still has value.160  Another way of 
characterizing this issue of partial or full evaluation of a utility’s property is 
to ask the question:  How much damage has the utility suffered? 
Utilities, for example, that have claimed that a portion of their 
property has been excluded from rate base treatment and, therefore, denied a 
return on investment, have not succeeded with their takings claim when the 
                                                 
151. See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of 
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., supra note 147. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 134–41. 
153. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005). 
154. Id. at 536–37. 
155. See, e.g., In re Citizens Util. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of 
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., supra note 147. 
156. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 695 (1923). 
157. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Customer Billing Arrangements, Case No. 
99-M-0631, 2000 WL 33938296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 19, 2000). 
158. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989). 
159. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
160. See, e.g., Barasch, 488 U.S. at 301–02. 
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remaining property is treated as a capital investment for which a return is 
due.161  States that have passed legislation requiring that only property that is 
used and useful can earn a return on investment have seen that legislation 
upheld as constitutional.162  Finally, to the extent that the regulated entity can 
take steps to mitigate any damages that might occur as a result of a 
regulation, they must do so, and failure to do so will negate the takings 
claim. 
As the electricity market undergoes its current transformation and as 
IOUs confront their current challenges, the issue of costs imposed on IOUs 
due to government regulation is ever present as revealed by the test case next 
discussed.163 
V. A DG TEST CASE 
IOUs have become concerned about the growth of solar power,164 
other renewables, and energy efficiency because of the consequent loss of 
load attributed to those activities.165  The use of solar power is expanding for 
three predominant reasons.166  First, the cost of solar panels is declining 
noticeably.167  Second, third party financing options make the installation of 
solar panels attractive to individual homeowners.168  And, third, existing state 
                                                 
161. See, e.g., id. 
162 See, e.g., id. 
163. See infra Part V. 
164. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3, 31. 
165. See id. 
166. See id.; Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://
www.solarcity.com/residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
167. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3. 
168. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114.  Third-
party financing essentially leases solar installations to individual homeowners or businesses 
under long term-contracts but retains ownership.  Id. at 23–24.  The third parties also operate 
the solar system.  See, e.g., Solar Power for Your Home, supra note 166.  These third-party 
owners can do so because in exchange for selling solar installation, they receive tax credits 
and other financial incentives as the nominal owner.  See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET 
ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 23–24. 
The use of third-party financing and third-party ownership has not gone 
unchallenged.  See, e.g., Ruling on Petition for Judicial Review at 3–4, SZ Enter., LLC v. 
Iowa Util. Bd., No. CVCV009166 (Iowa 5th Dist. Mar. 29, 2013).  From the perspective of 
the regulated utility, to the extent that third parties are financing a number of residential and 
commercial installations, those actors are invading the service territories of the incumbent 
utilities.  See, e.g., id. at 18.  The utility’s argument then, is that these third parties should be 
regulated as public utilities.  See, e.g., id. at 5.  This matter is currently under consideration by 
the Iowa Supreme Court.  Appellate Court Case Details for SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, Docket No. 13-0642, IOWA CT. ONLINE SEARCH, https://
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and federal regulations provide financial incentives for solar installations.169  
To an incumbent IOU, reduced electricity sales are a financial threat. 
On December 3, 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission issued 
a ruling that brings together the several issues in this article.170  The Arizona 
Public Service Company (“APS”), the local IOU, sought relief from 
regulatory obligations and petitioned the Commission to reduce the burdens 
imposed upon it by net metering regulations that required the utility to pay 
rooftop solar users for their excess electricity.171 
Arizona’s net metering law “allows electric utility customers to be 
compensated for generating their own electric[ity] . . . from [identified] 
renewable [behind-the-meter] resources,” such as solar power.172  “If [a] 
customer’s energy production exceeds the energy supplied by the electric 
utility during a billing period, [then] the customer’s bill for subsequent 
periods is credited for the excess generation.”173  The credit is based upon the 
IOU’s avoided cost or the customer’s retail rate.174  The avoided cost rate—
sometimes referred to as a bundled rate—means the marginal cost to the 
utility of producing its next unit of electricity.175 
To better understand the impact of avoided cost as defined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and in the Arizona Code, it is necessary 
                                                                                                                   
www.iowacourts.state.ia.us.ESAWebApp/AppelSimpFrame (search “Appellate Docket 
Number” for “13-0642”; then follow “13-0642” hyperlink under the “Docket No.” column; 
then follow “Docket” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
169. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 31. 
170. See generally Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 121, Docket No. E-
01345A-13-0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id.  The law does provide a safety valve and limits the size of the 
customers distributed generation system to a maximum of 125% of that customer’s total load.  
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.  This limitation is not unproblematic.  From a utility 
standpoint, this 125% maximum helps limit the amount of revenue loss.  Regulators, mindful 
of the need to protect the utility’s revenue requirement together with their service obligation, 
have adopted such limitations.  See generally SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, RATEMAKING, 
SOLAR VALUE AND SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING—A PRIMER (2013), available at 
http://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51299/sepa-nem-report-0713-print.pdf.  The 
problem, however, is that, to the extent that solar rooftop in particular or DG in general is 
either a desirable or inevitable direction for the future of the electric industry, the transition is 
being delayed.  Id. 
175. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 10.  Arizona more 
specifically defines avoided costs as “the incremental costs to an [e]lectric [u]tility for electric 
energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the Net Metering Facility, such 
utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.”  ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-2-
2302 (2013). 
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to understand how a utility bill is designed.  By way of simplification, a 
utility serves basically three types, or classes, of customers—residential, 
commercial, and industrial.176  Each class, in turn, has different energy needs 
and is charged accordingly.177  By way of example, residential customers 
consume less electricity than industrial customers; however, residential 
customers, as a class, consume more customer service for their homes in 
contrast with a large manufacturing company that requires less customer 
service for its plant relative to the amount of electricity consumed.178 
In the attempt to even out charges to each class of customers, a 
utility bill is generally comprised of three components—a demand charge, an 
energy or volumetric charge, and a customer service charge.179  The service 
charge represents the costs, such as billing, metering and some investments, 
to provide electricity service to each consumer.180  These charges remain flat 
relative to the amount of electricity that a user consumes, but the total cost 
varies with the number of customers.181  The energy charge represents the 
amount of electricity consumed by each user.182  And, finally, the demand 
charge represents the utility’s capital investment in plant and equipment that 
is allocated to each consumer based on the consumer’s maximum rate of 
usage.183  A rough way of differentiating these costs is to say that the energy 
charge and the service charge represent a utility’s variable costs while the 
demand charge represents the utility’s fixed costs.  Usually, residential 
consumers do not pay a separate demand charge.184  Instead, the fixed costs 
are embedded in the volumetric portion of the bill.185  This embeddedness, or 
bundling, gives rise to the problem litigated in this test case.186 
In its regulatory filing, APS argues that as participation in DG 
grows, it becomes increasingly concerned about the cross-subsidization 
between customer classes.187  DG customers, APS argues, are partially 
subsidized by non-DG customers because, it asserts, DG customers do not 
                                                 
176. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 13. 
179. Id. at 15–17.  PUCs often add other charges such as a surcharge for a 
specific investment.  Nonetheless, these three charges illustrate the distinction between fixed 
and variable costs.  See, e.g., id. 
180. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3, 15. 
181. Id. at 15. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 17. 
184. Id. at 15. 
185. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 15. 
186. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
28–29. 
187. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
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bear their fair share of fixed costs.188  Instead, they offload those costs to 
non-DG customers.189  Parenthetically, in addition to an unfair allocation of 
fixed costs, DG shows some income bias.190  Quite simply, higher income 
consumers have more options available to them, including installing rooftop 
solar, than lower income consumers.191  Consequently, rate designs that may 
apportion costs across all residential consumers will be regressive and 
unfairly burden low-income users.192 
The issue of cross-subsidization is problematic.193  The real concerns 
of APS, however, are that:  (1) Arizona’s net metering obligations became 
increasingly costly; (2) it was losing market share even though in its filing it 
asserted that revenue loss was not part of its case; (3) that non-DG users are 
paying a disproportionate share of the fixed costs; and, (4) most 
disconcerting for the utility, the cost increase to non-DG customers will 
effectively drive more people to DG thus resulting in greater revenue 
losses.194  This phenomenon of losing customers to DG because of increased 
costs is sometimes referred to as a death spiral, which is a  
situation that prompts/forces more ratepayers to install solar on 
their rooftop to avoid rising utility rates as a result of the spreading 
out of those fixed costs to a lower base.  In the end, the utility 
could be left with fewer revenues to support already installed (and 
future) infrastructure investments with long useful lives (i.e. 
transformers, low and high-voltage transmission lines, distribution 
assets).195 
To gather information and formulate a proposal to the Commission, 
APS held a series of conferences.196  APS then proposed solutions that fell 
into two broad classes.197  To simplify, the first option for new DG 
                                                 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. (Burns, Comm’r, dissenting). 
192. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING 
(NEM): DRAFT COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION 110–11 (2013); Sam Sciacca, Smart Grid 
Dilemma: Concerned Stakeholders Seek an Equitable Cost-Benefit Ratio for All Ratepayers, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2013, at 32, 33–34. 
193. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
30–31. 
194. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
195. CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 11–
12; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model has been 
stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”). 
196. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
197. Id. 
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customers198 was that net metering could continue to be used; however, new 
DG customers would have to pay under a rate schedule that better accounted 
for the demand (or fixed) costs of the utility’s service through the imposition 
of a “basic service charge, a demand charge, or a standby charge.”199  The 
second option entailed a recalibration of the net metering rate.200  New DG 
customers would be credited for the market value of the power that they sold 
to the utility rather than at the avoided cost.201  Further, the rate at which DG 
customers would be reimbursed would be recalibrated.202 
APS recognized that by effectively lowering the current net metering 
charge, rooftop solar installations may be slowed.203  To address that 
problem, APS suggested that the Commission should authorize cash 
payments to encourage greater DG penetration.204 
Commission staff responded to APS proposals by noting that 
Arizona’s net metering policy has been successful, that DG was expanding 
as intended, and that it was following the net metering practices of the 
majority of states.205  Staff acknowledged that DG customers effectively paid 
less of the utility’s fixed costs, and therefore non-DG customers were 
saddled with a portion of fixed costs higher than those actually used by 
them.206  APS introduced testimony that this cross-subsidization amounted to 
between $800 and $1,000 per year per DG customer.207  Consequently, those 
costs had to be picked up either through higher rates or other charges such as 
APS’s Lost Fixed Cost Recovery mechanism (“LFCR”).208 
Staff argued that the APS analysis neglected to address the benefits 
to the APS electric system derived from DG customers.209  The staff argued 
that there were quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits attributable to 
DG.210  The first quantifiable benefit is that APS will avoid paying certain 
                                                 
198. Existing customers would be grandfathered into the rate schemes in 
existence, for twenty years.  Id.  After that time, however, APS posed that the new rates would 
be imposed.  Id.  The problem with this proposal, however, is that the rates should attach to 
the property rather than to the customer.  Id. 
199. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
205. Id. 
206. Id.; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 17. 
207. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
208. Id.  The LFCR is a surcharge allowed by regulators that is intended to 
offset the revenue that results from customers who reduce their bills through conservation and 
other renewable energy programs.  Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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fuel costs and avoid making certain capital investments in plant transmission 
or distribution.211  Non-quantifiable benefits include “increased grid security 
and air quality improvements,”212 improved system reliability,213 load 
balancing,214 improved forecasting and planning,215 environmental 
improvement, and meeting regulatory requirements such as renewable 
portfolio mandates.216  To be sure, accurately valuing the benefits of DG is 
difficult and—according to one study—most analyses had failed to 
comprehensively evaluate the benefits and costs of DG.217  Still, such 
benefits may well be accounted for through a smart rate design.218  Not 
surprisingly, intervenors representing solar interests, argued that APS should 
award a system benefit credit to DG users for the contributions that they 
make to the grid.219 
Staff concluded that both options offered by APS should be rejected 
and that the Commission should open a separate docket to more fully study 
the issue, taking into account the benefits, as well as the costs, of DG.220  The 
Commission, then, should develop a new rate design to account for DG 
penetration.221 
The Commission concluded that the proliferation of DG installations 
did result in a cost shift from DG customers to non-DG residential 
customers; therefore, rate design changes were warranted.222  As an interim 
measure, the Commission imposed a seventy-cent per kilowatt monthly 
                                                 
211. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.  Because distributed generation is 
closer to its end users—sometimes located on exactly the same property—the need for 
extensive transmission and distribution lines is mitigated.  Id. 
212. Id. 
213. LENA HANSEN & VIRGINIA LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., A REVIEW OF 
SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 37 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/
Knowledge-Center%2FLibrary%2F2013-13_eLabDERCostValue.  System reliability can be 
improved by distributed generation as it reduces congestion, reduces large-scale outages, and 
can provide backup power during outages.  Id. 
214. Id. at 15; see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra 
note 114, at 32–33. 
215. See, e.g., Margaret Jolly et al., Capturing Distributed Benefits:  Factoring 
Customer-Owned Generation into Forecasting, Planning, and Operations, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Aug. 2012, at 32, 34–35. 
216. STERLING ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 7, at ix, 
27–28; see also SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 25, 28. 
217. HANSEN & LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 213, at 4. 
218. Richard Perez et al., Why a Smart Fit Policy Is a Smart Policy, SOLAR 
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 18, 18, available at http://www.omagdigital.com/publication/
?i=145842&p=19. 
219. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
220. Id. 
221. See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11, 18. 
222. See id. at 20. 
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charge for all residential DG customers until the Commission more fully 
addressed the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.223  The goal of the 
interim measure, then, is to not raise the amount of fixed costs APS collects 
from residential non-DG customers due to reduced payments by DG 
customers.224 
The advantage of the seventy-cent fixed cost charge—also 
sometimes referred to as an access fee, solar rider, or standby charge—is its 
simplicity.225  New DG customers will know what the charge is and why it is 
imposed.226  Further, such charges are intended “to recover a portion of the 
utility fixed costs that have typically been embedded in volumetric 
[electricity] rates.”227  In principle, this approach allows those fixed costs to 
be fairly allocated among all customers, and specifically, DG customers.228 
The test case raises exactly the correct issues and suggests a 
direction for a correct solution as long as all benefits and costs are taken into 
account.229  While the Arizona case is an important one to watch, a series of 
studies and other actions are occurring throughout the industry and in many 
states including California, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Texas, 
                                                 
223. See MARK NEWTON LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., 
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION FOR EVOLVING UTILITY CHALLENGES:  AN UPDATED SURVEY 21–
23 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/
innovative_regulation_survey.pdf; CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
224. See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 2–3, 20. 
225. See id. at 3. 
226. See id. 
227. Id.; see KYLE MACLAURY, CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, ASSESSING 
MINNESOTA’S SOLAR RESOURCE: REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEM ORIENTATION 
AND RATE STRUCTURE 4 (2011), available at http://www.mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/
SolarValueReport.pdf (noting that Minnesota has several rate designs to accommodate PV 
generation). 
228. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3. 
229. See CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 
11–12. 
There is a middle ground solution on the compensation issue for DG, in 
our view.  Either:  (1) a set fixed charge for T&D or (2) a credit that only reflects 
the utilities replacement power cost of generation.  Eventually, for DG to work at a 
larger scale with the support of the utilities, we expect changes to the compensation 
structure for the off grid solar providers in the near future.  These changes more 
specifically could include:  (1) a bill credit that is lowered from the current 
avoidance of full retail rates to one that resembles the utilities replace cost of power 
(i.e. gas peaker) and/or (2) a demand charge (fixed charge for T&D) to be tacked on 
to the off grid solar homeowners electric bills.  These items provide a middle 
ground solution, in our viewpoint, with net metering battles clearly evident in 
several states like CA and AZ. 
Id. at 12.  See also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model 
has been stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”). 
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Vermont,230 Idaho,231 and others.232  In California, for example, legislation 
was passed directing the California PUC to study the costs and benefits of 
net metering and calculate the ratepayer impacts and cost of service to solar 
customers.233 
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, IOUs have been 
experiencing increased competition from technological innovations as well 
as from innovative regulatory strategies.234  On the positive side, the 
electricity market is becoming more competitive; consumers are enjoying a 
wider array of choices; and, energy policy is moving towards a clean energy 
economy.235  Incumbents, however, must deal with the negative side of a 
changing electric industry.236  More precisely, the challenge is to address the 
matter of past investments made by incumbents.237  Now that consumers are 
leaving the grid in whole or in part, which, if any, of the capital investments 
should be recouped by IOUs? 
Fortunately, DG penetration into electricity markets at this time in 
history is relatively low and warnings about a death spiral for IOUs is 
premature and alarmist.238  The amount of penetration by DG, at this time, is 
minimal and manageable.239  A smart electric utility, like the smart 
telecommunications firm, can get ahead of the technology and it can 
certainly manage it to their advantage even if that necessitates changing the 
                                                 
230. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4; see also Herman K. 
Trabish, Rooftop Solar and Net Metering Win a Big Decision in Colorado: Regulators Want a 
Better Way to Value Solar, GREENTECHMEDIA (Jan. 30, 2014), http://greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/rooftop-solar-and-net-metering-win-a-big-decision-in-colorado. 
231. ID PUC Rules Against Idaho Power in “Net Metering” Case, SNAKE 
RIVER ALLIANCE (July 3, 2013), http://snakeriveralliance.org/id-puc-rules-against-idaho-
power-in-net-metering-case/; see also Case Summary, PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://
www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/cases/summary/IPCE1227.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2014). 
232. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4. 
233. Assemb. 327, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
234. See Andrew Kosnaski & Ramesh Shankar, Embracing Disruption: 
Developing a Leadership Role for Utilities in Alternative Technologies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 
2014, at 16, 16. 
235. See id. at 20. 
236. Id. at 16. 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the 
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher 
rates for those customers remaining—first creating a cross subsidy from wealthier 
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further 
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives. 
Kosnaki & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16. 
239. See BART KRISHANMOORTHY ET AL., SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, 2012 
SEPA UTILITY SOLAR RANKINGS 6 fig.4 (2013), available at http://
www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51302/final-2012-top-10-report-v2.pdf. 
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firm’s business model.  But then, that is what smart businesses do.  DG 
penetration, however, is expanding and therefore caution is warranted.240  
Regulators must provide a mechanism that compensates IOUs for their 
investments and they must design a new regulatory regime for a clean energy 
future.  Additionally, regulators must insure that customers are treated fairly, 
that cross-subsidization is minimized or justified on sound policy bases, and 
that the proper balance between shareholder and ratepayers is realized.241  In 
short, rates must respond to the legitimate concerns of the utility and to the 
value provided by DG customers.242  Those responses will come from a 
renegotiated regulatory compact, new rate designs, and new business models 
for IOUs.243  Each of those issues is addressed in the following Parts. 
VI. THE NEW REGULATORY COMPACT 
The core of the regulatory compact is that the government sets the 
utility’s rates—and consequently, its profits—in exchange for protecting the 
IOU’s service territory.244  As long as the IOU operates prudently, it is 
virtually guaranteed a return on its capital investment.  When the compact 
was made, the exclusive business of the IOU was to sell as much electricity 
as it could.245  As we have seen, the electric market is changing in significant 
ways, such that a new regulatory compact must be considered.246 
We can start with certain concrete assumptions.  First, large-scale 
central power stations will continue to be important generators in the 
electricity market, although on a diminishing scale.  Second, the T&D 
segments of the industry will continue to be regulated as long as they exhibit 
natural monopoly characteristics.  Third, IOUs can no longer be devoted 
                                                 
240. See, e.g., id. at 23. 
241. See Sciacca, supra note 192, at 33–34.  The rate design issues that plague 
rooftop solar and other DG strategies also complicate a utility’s smart grid investments.  Id.  
More specifically, 
[d]o individual end users save enough money on their bills with AMI, for instance, 
to offset the increase in rates necessary to pay for that infrastructure?  If so, how 
long does it take to achieve payback, or ROI?  If the benefits [are not] direct and 
quantifiable, then what reasoning in metrics justify such a project? 
Id. at 33; see Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Patrick Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council, 
EEI/NRDG Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp. 
242. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 32. 
243. Id. at 36. 
244. Tomain, The iUtility, supra note 94, at 223, 231. 
245. See id. 
246. See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 5; Tomain, 
The iUtility, supra note 94, at 234; Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”:  Greening the 
Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 931, 933 (2009) [hereinafter Tomain, “Steel in the 
Ground”]. 
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exclusively to electricity sales.  Instead, IOUs must be seen as actors in a 
broader energy business that provides a wider array of energy services and 
products as discussed in Part III.247  Finally, because IOUs will continue to 
be regulated, the regulatory compact will continue.  However, given these 
assumptions a new set of regulatory principles will be necessary and we can 
identify five. 
A. Stranded Costs 
First, utilities should not be put in a position of incurring excess 
costs that, due to regulatory or policy changes, may become stranded and 
may then give rise to a regulatory takings claim.  This principle is actually a 
two-edged sword.  On the one hand, investors should not be deprived of a 
return on their investments due to regulatory or policy changes.248  On the 
other hand, regulators must be careful when imposing requirements on 
IOUs.249  As discussed in Part I, regulators and legislators in the past have 
provided relief to utilities from previous financial challenges.250  Thus, to the 
extent that IOUs invest in reliance on regulatory requirements, then some 
protection must be provided.251  Nevertheless, as contemporary energy policy 
changes, the problem of stranded costs should be anticipated and, if possible, 
avoided.252 
The stranded cost problem in the context of an energy transition is 
distinct from the problem of nuclear power cancellations and the like, and 
from government ordered divestment.  First, in the nuclear power and 
divestment situations, the stranded costs were more or less identifiable and 
occurred at a very time-specific point. 253  A clean energy transition is 
distinguishable in that it will not occur at a point in time, but will most likely 
occur over decades.  This fact alone should allow utilities to plan for changes 
in the industry and changes in their own business models.  Next, as a utility’s 
                                                 
247. See supra Part III. 
248. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29; see David B. Raskin, The 
Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 47 (2013), 
http://www.hblr.org/?p=3673.  “[The] inability of utility shareholders to secure the return of, 
and a competitive rate of return on, their investment gives rise to the condition known as 
stranded investment or stranded costs.”  SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29. 
249. See id.; Raskin, supra note 248, at 47. 
250. Raskin, supra note 248, at 47; see supra Part I. 
251. See Raskin, supra note 248, at 47.  Raskin also writes:  “The differential 
was known as ‘stranded costs.’”  Id. 
252. KIND, supra note 4, at 17–18.  One suggestion for addressing the stranded 
cost problem is to impose a stranded cost charge on all DER customers to recoup that portion 
of the investment that might otherwise become stranded due to departures from the grid.  Id. at 
18. 
253. See id. at 8. 
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customer base declines, the downward spiral in lost sales will mean that there 
will be a smaller group of ratepayers to pick up increasing costs.254  That is a 
scenario that is obviously not sustainable. 
Nevertheless, although the law regarding regulatory or deregulatory 
takings remains opaque, the risks are real.255  Investors will be reluctant to 
invest without reasonable assurances of a return on their investment that will 
not be negated by prudence hearings, regulatory changes, or legislation that 
diminishes the value of their property to the point at which their investment-
backed expectations go uncompensated.  Indeed, such financial risk is 
reflected in the downward movement of credit ratings for the electric 
industry.256  Thus, the issue of distributed generation, particularly coupled 
with net metering, can pose a real risk to capital unless the utility recalibrates 
the way it does business and regulators rethink their rules.257 
B. Legacy Financing 
Second, regulators should avoid legacy financing.  Quite simply, 
traditionally structured utilities should not continue to be rewarded as they 
have in the past.  Any argument that utilities should continue to earn revenue 
because demand is down must be scrutinized quite closely.  Decreased 
demand alone is no cause for continuing to allow a regulated firm to earn a 
return on investment.258  The problem, of course, is complicated because the 
current challenge to IOUs is the consequence of both market and 
technological changes, as well as regulatory requirements.  Nevertheless, no 
utility has any legal claim to continue to maintain its revenue requirement 
just because it loses sales.259  The idea that the revenue requirement must be 
                                                 
254. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16; Raskin, supra note 248, at 
48. 
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the 
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher 
rates for those customers remainingfirst creating a cross subsidy from wealthier 
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further 
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives. 
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16. 
255. Compare SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222, with Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436–38 
(2000). 
256. See KIND, supra note 4, at 10 fig.2. 
257. See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences: The 
Transition to Distributed Generation Calls for a New Regulatory Model, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Mar. 2013, at 44, 47.  “As [distributed generation] grows, such under-recovery has the 
potential to materially weaken the utility’s financial integrity and its ability to attract investor 
capital, which in turn can lead to higher rates.”  Id. 
258. See Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945). 
259. See id. 
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maintained as embedded in a cost-of-service mentality to cover a utility’s 
costs, regardless of the amount of service, is no longer tenable. 
Cost-of-service ratemaking may have had its place; nevertheless, it 
should not be used to allow utilities to continue to build dirty coal-fired 
plants, nor should it be used to reward utilities for embarking on financially 
risky nuclear projects precisely because “investment in conventional 
generation [is] hard to justify” in the new market.260  Indeed, financial 
analyses indicate that solar, wind, and natural gas generated electricity are 
showing increasingly positive cost signals, particularly against nuclear 
power.261  As a result, continued investments in coal and nuclear power will 
be viewed skeptically by the market while investments in new fuels and 
technologies are becoming increasingly attractive.262  Those investments 
must also be viewed skeptically by regulators.  Thus, instead of maintaining 
the status quo, regulators must manage the changing role of IOUs and 
encourage alterations in their business models.263 
C. Innovation & Competition 
Third, the new regulatory compact should encourage—rather than 
inhibit—competition and the development of innovative energy technologies 
including sales reducing technologies such as DG.  Indeed, the alternative 
energy market is attracting significant investments and will only expand.264 
DG is becoming an increasingly important actor in electricity 
markets.  In the test case, APS argued that it needed to revise net metering 
rates in order to avoid unfair cross-subsidization.265  Behind that argument, 
                                                 
260. CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73 (a report for Citi GPS). 
261. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY 
RELEASE OVERVIEW 7, 11 fig.8, 12 fig.11 (2013), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf. 
262. See, e.g., id. 
263. See ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NEW BUSINESS 
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE 
CONSTELLATION 8 (2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/New_Business_Models. 
264. See JOEL MAKOWER, GREENBIZ GRP. & TRUCOST, STATE OF GREEN 
BUSINESS 2014 58, 60 (2014), available at http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2014/01/
19/state-green-business-report-2014; CITI, CITI CLIMATE CHANGE UNIVERSE 3 (2013), 
available at http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/17389986/1546283763/name/CITI+Climate+
Change+Universe.pdf (projecting the need for $37 trillion in energy transformation over the 
next twenty-two years, with $24 trillion of that amount devoted to clean energy including gas, 
and $6 trillion in renewable power generation). 
265. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 12i, Docket No. E-01345A-13-
0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., 
NET METERING BILL IMPACTS AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY SUBSIDIES: REPORT PREPARED FOR 
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.navigant.com/~/media/www/
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however, APS was concerned about loss of sales volume.266  To the extent 
that net metering rates do generate an unfair cross-subsidization, then they 
should be changed.  However, net metering benefits must also be accounted 
for,267 and to the extent that net metering rates may slow DG penetration and 
therefore, act as a drag on innovation and competition, then that argument 
should be rejected.  The smart utility will become actively involved with DG 
as well as with the development of utility-scale solar, wind, and other 
renewable projects.268 
D. Universal Service & Reliability 
Next, regulators must be attentive to maintaining universal electric 
service.  With the expansion of distributed generation and energy-efficient 
improvements, some customers will be placed at a disadvantage such that 
distributed generation and energy-efficient customers will be using less 
electricity which puts pressure on utilities to raise rates to the customers that 
remain in that territory.  Similarly, regulators must assure energy/electricity 
reliability.  Electricity must remain available at the flip of a switch for most 
consumers.  To be sure, those consumers that have access to other sources of 
electricity, such as distributed generation and the like, may be able to 
negotiate for interruptible rates.  Most consumers, however, will need firm 
service contracts. 
The provision of universal reliable service presents challenges all of 
its own.269  However, an increase in electricity providers does have the 
potential for bringing significant benefits to a utility’s T&D segments.270  
Reduced load can, at times, reduce congestion and improve balancing, and a 
larger number of providers should lower cyber security risks.  To be sure, the 
issue of reliability will be an argument to be made against DG and that 
                                                                                                                   
site/insights/Energy/Navigant%20Final%20Net%20Metering%20Impact%20Report_Revised
%20Dec%2011.ashx. 
266. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 265; NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., 
supra note 265, at 7. 
267. See, e.g., R. THOMAS BEACH & PATRICK G. MCGUIRE, CROSSBORDER 
ENERGY, EVALUATING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NET ENERGY METERING IN CALIFORNIA 
19–20 (2013), available at http://www.votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Crossborder-Energy-CA-Net-Metering-Cost-Benefit-Jan-2013-final.pdf. 
268. See, e.g., Brad Copithorne, 4 Utilities Thinking Beyond ‘Wires and Poles,’ 
GREENBIZ.COM (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/10/09/4-utilities-think-
beyond-wires-poles. 
269. See Amory Lovins, Amory Lovins:  Don’t Cry for the Electric Utilities, 
GREENBIZ.COM (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/02/12/dont-lament-
renewables-disruption-electric-utilities. 
270. See id. 
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argument should be recognized for what it is—a political argument not 
necessarily a technical nor economic one.271 
E. Mitigation 
The Arizona test case, and others like it, as well as the reports of the 
dire threats to electric utilities, clearly demonstrate that IOUs are well aware 
of changing electricity market conditions as well as aware of a change in the 
policy landscape towards clean energy.  As a consequence, utilities cannot 
rely on past practices for future revenue.  Instead, since IOUs are well aware 
of the political economy of a changing energy market, they cannot continue 
to do business as usual; to the extent that they can avoid incurring 
expenditures based upon past assumptions, they must do so in an effort to 
mitigate damages as is required by any contract. 
During the period of electric industry restructuring, for example, 
New Hampshire passed legislation intended to introduce competition into 
retail electric markets.272  As part of those efforts, independent system 
operators controlled the transmission grid by accepting bilateral contracts 
and operating a power exchange with spot markets.273  The New Hampshire 
restructuring plan would treat generation and retail marketing as functionally 
separate from T&D services.274  The legislation expressed a preference for 
the divestiture of a utility’s generation and transportation assets.275  Utilities 
operating under the previous statutory scheme were concerned about 
stranded assets.276  More specifically, regulators recognized the fact that if 
retail customers could purchase lower-priced electricity from sources other 
than the IOU, then a portion of the IOU’s investments may be 
unrecoverable.277 
The New Hampshire PUC recognized this possibility and made 
provisions that would allow the utility to recover its stranded costs if those 
costs were found to have resulted from a government regulation.278  The 
utility, however, would not be able to recover stranded costs if they were 
imprudently incurred.279  Concomitantly, the legislation required utilities to 
                                                 
271. See id. 
272. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:1 (2013); Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. 
Indus., 171 P.U.R. 4th 564, DR 96-150, 1996 WL 591937 (N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 10, 
1996). 
273. See Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272. 
279. Id. 
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mitigate their stranded costs.280  Moreover, the commission took a fairly 
aggressive approach regarding mitigation efforts that the utility should 
undertake.281  Those steps included, among other efforts, “the sale of . . . 
excess generating capacity” and the renegotiation of service contracts.282 
By adopting these principles, then, the regulatory compact will 
continue to balance utility/shareholder interests with customer/ratepayer 
interests while maintaining reasonable and fair rates.  At the same time, the 
new regulatory compact will encourage utilities to adopt new business 
models; promote technological innovation and competition; expand market 
opportunities; and, increase consumer choice.  The regulatory compact, 
however, is not self-executing.  Instead, PUCs must adopt a forward-looking 
approach to ratemaking. 
VII. RATEMAKING 
Ratemaking is the mechanism that drives the regulatory compact.  
Historically, cost-of-service ratemaking has had remarkable persistence even 
though regulators have been experimenting with performance-based rates 
and with market-based rates for decades.283  As noted earlier, when the 
electric industry was challenged by nuclear and restructuring failures, 
regulators relied on cost-based ratemaking.284  In times of financial stress, 
when utilities confronted volatile costs for fuel or wrestled with inflation, 
they sought refuge behind automatic fuel adjustment clauses that allowed 
rates to escalate in tandem with those rising costs.285  Similarly, regulators 
have relied on this formula and, in some instances, have expanded its use.286  
Such devices as forward test years,287 multi-year rate structures,288 cost 
trackers, and the like, are all cost-based.289 
                                                 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. See, e.g., SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: 
THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND JURISDICTION 216 (2013). 
284. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 18–19. 
285. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5 (a 
report for the Edison Electric Institute on cost trackers); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., 
supra note 17, at 18–19 (fuel adjustment mechanisms).  Another mechanism for recovering 
costs during construction periods is to include construction costs while they are ongoing.  
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5.  This mechanism is 
known as construction work in progress.  Id. 
286. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 23. 
287. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 27. 
288. Id. at 31. 
289. See id. at 5, 27, 31. 
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In brief, cost-based ratemaking functions well when the market is 
expanding and demand continues to grow.  Once the market slows or stalls, 
then cost-based ratemaking may contribute to excess capacity and other 
economic dislocations.290  Further, “cost of service regulation can slow the 
pace of innovation and may offer little incentive for utilities to improve 
operational efficiency or service quality beyond the minimum levels set by 
regulators.”291 
Nevertheless, cost-of-service ratemaking has a strong hold on the 
regulatory structure.  “The regulatory framework has been resilient in the 
face of the flux brought about by economic, technical, and financial shocks 
that often nullified one or more of the assumptions underlying the original 
framework, precisely because of the willingness to adopt incremental 
changes to the process.”292  However, another way of analyzing cost-of 
service ratemaking is to argue that it has not been resistant to change and that 
the ratemaking formula must adapt to today’s changing market conditions. 
The most immediate problem, then, is that cost-of-service 
ratemaking was dedicated to covering a utility’s prudently incurred costs.  
Now the problem is that utilities cannot continue to make the same types of 
investments that they have in the past particularly in light of falling sales that 
can threaten a utility’s of financial stability.293  In brief, the traditionally 
structured electric utility, as well as its regulators, must figure out how to 
earn money by selling less electricity while promoting other energy services 
and products. 
Fortunately, there is no shortage of new rate designs294 including:  
(1) performance-based ratemaking;295 (2) incentive rates;296 (3) alternative 
regulation;297 (4) market-based rates; (5) decoupling;298 (6) feed-in-tariffs;299 
                                                 
290. See MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3.  This tendency to invest 
and expand is also known as the A-J effect or the Averch-Johnson effect, based upon the 
seminal paper by Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson.  Harvey Averch & Leland L. 
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 
(1962). 
291. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3. 
292. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 1. 
293. Burr, supra note 9, at 30. 
294. See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 174–79. 
295. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SCHMIDT, PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2000). 
296. See, e.g., Scott H. Strauss & Jeffrey A. Schwarz, Transmission Incentive 
Overhaul: FERC’s ROE Incentive Adder Policy Sends the Wrong Signals, 147 PUB. UTIL. 
FORT. Feb. 2009, at 32, 33. 
297. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 1 (a 
report for the Edison Electric Institute). 
298. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND 
DECOUPLING:  A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 1–2 (2011), available at http://
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and, (7) results-based regulation as examples.300  In choosing among new 
rate designs, regulators must “address the fact that in an efficient, modern 
utility, conventional revenue recovery may no longer keep pace with utility 
system costs, investment needs, and the changing dynamics of customers 
which have a growing range of energy related choices ranging from DG to 
demand response.”301  Further, rates should be seen as “a means by which 
energy companies communicate their value proposition to their customers—
[and] not merely the process by which they collect revenues.”302  Thus, while 
a wide variety of approaches can be adapted for a new electricity market, any 
choice should be based upon a set of principles. 
A. Costs 
While costs will most likely play some role in any new rate 
design,303 the move away from using historically embedded costs—or even 
future tests year costs—as the central element of utilities revenue 
requirement must be changed.  A key move away from cost-based 
ratemaking is decoupling.  At its simplest form, decoupling means that rates 
will not be based on the volume of electricity sales; instead, rates will be 
based on other indicators such as the number of customers served.304   
Another basic element of decoupling is that it allows for periodic rate 
adjustments.305  Still, there are a variety of decoupling mechanisms.306  
“Some mechanisms use the revenue authorized in the utility’s last general 
rate case; others adjust that for specific cost changes or according to a 
                                                                                                                   
www.raponline.org/document/download/id/861; see also LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. 
RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 15–16. 
299. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff:  A Policy Tool Encouraging 
Deployment of Renewable Electricity Technologies (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
300. MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 3. 
301. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 14. 
302. Philip Q. Hanser, Rate Design by Objective: A Purposeful Approach to 
Setting Energy Prices, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2012, at 48, 50. 
303. MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 14. 
304. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 298, at 2. 
305. PAMELA MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR 
US ENERGY UTILITIES:  RATE IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS 6 (rev. ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rcavanagh/decouplingreportMorganfinal
.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Pat Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council, 
EEI/NRDC Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp. 
306. MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., supra note 305, at 5. 
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formula, and still others calculate revenue on a per-customer account basis 
rather than as a single dollar amount.”307 
B. Innovation and Transition 
Rate designs can promote innovation and assist in the clean energy 
transition by allowing utilities to recover investments in innovation, energy 
efficiency, or renewable resources.308  Smart grid investments should be 
recouped, for example.309  Similarly, investments in smart meters, energy 
savings appliances, energy audits, and the like should be encouraged and 
included in any utilities revenue requirement.  Regulators, of course, will 
have a great degree of discretion.  Some investments can be included in rate 
base, and therefore can earn a return for shareholders.  Other investments can 
be treated as costs and recouped dollar-for-dollar. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the utility regulator has 
adopted a Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, Innovation, and Outputs 
(“RIIO”) rate design.310  The intent is to have “utilities . . . focus on 
delivering long-term value to customers.”311  “Revenues [will be] set based 
[up]on a review of the utility’s business plan,” including planned operating 
expenses as well as an assessment of future capital investment.312  The rates 
are then set on a multi-year basis and are intended to “provide[] an incentive 
for the utility to pursue efficiency improvements by [allowing a] utility . . . to 
retain [some] of [the] cost savings.”313  Indeed, cost sharing is a principal that 
should incentivize utilities to earn savings that can then be shared with 
customers.314  Again, regulators will have discretion on the proportion of cost 
sharing between the parties, but the idea is to create incentives for innovation 
and efficiency.315 
In the same way that revenue decoupling and shared savings 
policies together can provide strong incentives for utilities to 
invest in energy efficiency, a similar approach could strengthen 
incentives for utilities to invest in distributed generation, storage, 
microgrids, smart electric vehicle charging, smart inverters, or 
other distributed technologies to reduce operating costs and/or [to] 
                                                 
307. Id. at 6. 
308. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 13. 
309. Id. at 5. 
310. Id. at 16. 
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defer or avoid the need for investments to expand capacity of 
distribution feeders or invest[ed] in . . . other electricity supply, 
transmission, or distribution assets.316 
A smart rate design, then, may require hybrid pricing models that 
apply to different investments and to different expenses.  Electricity rates can 
be unbundled for different purposes such as “unbundled pricing for 
reliability, standby, and power quality services; temporally or locationally 
differentiated prices for energy or distribution services; price structures that 
reflect how costs are incurred—e.g. fixed, demand-based, energy-based, 
etc.—and incentive payments for dispatchable demand response or ancillary 
services to the grid.”317 
Smart rate designs, then, “may ultimately create a nimble system that 
pays for required services, maximizes value, and allows for effective 
implementation.”318  The core idea behind moving away from cost-based 
ratemaking to rate designs that are more sensitive to the market and 
technological developments is to encourage competition and enable utilities 
to capitalize on new opportunities.319 
C. Balance of Interests 
Shareholders, of course, will only invest if they earn a reasonable 
return on their investment.  That return must be comparable with investments 
of similar risk.  Nevertheless, shareholders do take on some investment risk 
and they should not be guaranteed a return at the expense of customers who 
may receive little or no benefit.320  The trick, of course, is in clearly 
identifying the risks to shareholders, as well as the costs and benefits to 
consumers.  Rates should send clear price signals that account for both fixed 
and variable costs,321 avoid cross-subsidization as much as possible,322 and 
represent the value of services provided to the customer by the utility.323  
“Building a shared understanding among stakeholders and regulators in the 
electricity sector about the full range of costs and benefits of distributed 
energy resources and the implications of net energy metering is an essential 
                                                 
316. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 46. 
317. ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 14. 
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first step toward devising rates and incentives that will create the greatest 
benefit for all.”324 
D. Prudence and Needs Reviews 
Prudence reviews became a matter of concern to utilities with the 
collapse of the nuclear power industry.  The possibility of a prudence review 
constitutes a risk to investors; however, all risk cannot and should not be 
eliminated.325  The fact that utility’s capital investment will be reviewed for 
prudence should be considered simply a matter of bringing business 
discipline into the electricity market.  A prudence review should work hand-
in-hand with the obligation of a utility to mitigate the costs of unwise 
investments. 
Generally, a prudence review occurs at the time a utility wants to 
include specific investments in the rate base as part of a rate hearing.326  The 
problem with ex post reviews of investment decisions should be apparent.  
At Time One—for example—a utility assesses the need for a capital 
investment.327  Construction projects—particularly nuclear plants—take 
years and up to a decade or more to complete.  Consequently, the decision to 
include that investment in the rate base will occur at a time when future 
market and financial conditions, as well as the need for energy, can change 
significantly.  One way of reducing the risk of a disallowance at Time Two 
when the prudence review takes place is for regulators to aggressively assess 
the need for power before the investment is made.328  These two sets of 
principles, both for the regulatory compact and for new rate designs, are 
intended to encourage IOUs to reshape the way they do business.329 
VIII. NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 
One need only look at the technological advances in telephony and 
computers to realize that the world is changed in ways that will not return.  
Landlines and desktop computers have largely become things of the past.  
Electricity providers are proliferating, energy efficient appliances and 
                                                 
324. Id. at 36. 
325. See Rilck Noel, Managing Risk:  Prudence Reviews and Nuclear Projects, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2006, at 21, 23. 
326. See id. at 21. 
327. See id. at 22–23. 
328. See Util. Reform Network v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 
762–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); N. States Power Co., MPUC Docket No. E-002/CN-12-1240 
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buildings are reducing per capita use, and competition and consumer choices 
for power providers are increasing.  IOUs, whether they like it or not, are in a 
new market.  Indeed, electric utilities should take a lesson from the 
telecommunications playbook and invest in change rather than continue to 
resist it.330 
The renegotiated regulatory compact, together with innovative rate 
designs, can encourage utilities to change the way they do business.  More 
specifically, IOUs whose primary or exclusive business is to increase 
electricity sales cannot stay complacent in today’s changing market.  Instead, 
utilities must offer a wider array of energy products and services, running 
from renewable energy and energy efficiency, to performing energy audits 
for its customers and broadening the array of power providers.331  In 
particular, utilities must act “more aggressively [by] looking at programs to 
use distributed assets to their benefit so that they can have a wider 
distribution of generation assets throughout their service areas.”332  By way 
of example, NRG Energy333 and NextEra Energy334 are developing utility-
scale solar and other renewable projects; firms like Direct Energy335 and 
Veridian336 have partnered with Solar City to offer solar installations to their 
customers; and Duke Energy and PSE&G have been “invest[ing] in 
residential solar, microgrids, energy storage and smart grid technologies.”337  
Indeed, opportunities abound for forward thinking utilities such as San Diego 
Gas & Electric, which has proposed a strategy to engage in three energy 
services functions:  (1) generate and sell electricity to serve customers’ real-
time needs; (2) provide distribution services; and (3) help customers manage 
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electricity use through programs that promote efficiency, smart appliances 
and meters, electric vehicle charging, and the like.338 
Traditionally structured, vertically integrated electric utilities served 
the country well for most of the twentieth century as demand continued to 
grow.  Now with flattening demand, together with the need for investments 
in grid improvement, smart grid technologies, access to the grid by variable 
resources, reliability, cyber security, and pushes for greater use of renewable 
resources and energy efficiency, the utility of the future must acknowledge 
that the integrated utility model will not function effectively in a DG 
world.339  In short, as former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) Chair Jon Wellinghoff has stated, “utilities are going to have to 
have the ability to morph into those roles of entrepreneurs and marketers and 
deliverers of these energy services to be able to effectively compete with all 
the other people in the space.”340  Further, today’s electric utilities must also 
recognize that the new market “does present new avenues for investment and 
growth in terms of grid expansion, smart grid, storage, and downstream 
services; the question is whether utilities grasp that opportunity and evolve 
themselves.”341 
One way of conceptualizing the new utility model is to focus on 
distribution and customer service rather than on generation where the 
utility’s primary business is to serve as a grid operator in an environment of 
wholesale and retail competition.342  Innovative utilities are sensitive to 
customer demand.343  Studies show, for example, that consumers are 
responding to price information and that they are reducing consumption at 
peak times.344  Some of this consumer price responsiveness is due to pilot 
programs such as those in California, which are being operated by San Diego 
Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison that provide rebates to 
customers for electricity saved in particular peak event days.345  In addition, 
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behind-the-meter technologies such as home displays, programmable 
thermostats and other appliances, along with simple social networking, all 
provide information about how consumers can increase their energy 
efficiency to help IOUs develop their business plans.346 
Thus, the utility of the future must start with the recognition that 
their primary business is not selling a commodity; it is providing and 
managing an infrastructure service.347 
The entrepreneurs who put that competitive solar power on your 
roof with no money down can provide a portfolio of other equally 
unregulated products, like efficiency, demand response, storage, 
and so on, that could ultimately add up to a virtual utility providing 
the same services that utilities now provide—quite possibly with 
lower cost and greater reliability and resilience.348 
Another, similar, way of conceptualizing the utility of the future is to 
see it as a network entity. 
Under a network utility approach, the utility would 
provide highly differentiated price signals to direct investments by 
other service providers.  In this case, the utility’s role would 
increasingly be focused on maintaining and operating the grid and 
on creating markets, managing transactions, replacing aging 
distribution equipment, and/or making smart grid investments and 
interconnecting buyers and sellers with the network.  This network 
utility would shepherd and coordinate the network of increasingly 
complex transactions among [a] growing number of actors.349 
Such a utility would:  (1) pick a distribution area where a utility plans to 
expand, upgrade or modernize; (2) assess peak load demand; (3) use demand 
side management to target reducing loads; and (4) expand DG rather than 
add transportation and distribution. 
Such new business approaches should be responsive to any number 
of issues.  If large capital investments are too financially risky, then they can 
be scaled down.  If investments in efficiency and in DG are less costly and 
less risky than building a new plant or making significant additions to T&D, 
then those investments should be made.  Similarly, if the concern with 
upgrading and modernizing the grid is cyber security, then reducing the scale 
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of generation and multiplying power sites rather than concentrating them will 
reduce those risks.  Also, if natural disasters threaten the grid,350 then DG, 
microgrids,351 and the like may well prove to be smart alternatives. 
The utility of the future, then, will adopt a new vision of the 
electricity business.  The new utility will see itself not as a isolated actor in 
the market, but as part of a network “that provides a platform for the 
economic and operational integration of distributed resources.”352  The new 
utility will use more transparent costs and benefits of service, including 
technical standards, such as those needed for interconnection, as well as 
economic standards, such as those used in making value determinations and 
pricing goods and services generally.353  The new utility will be a value 
creator by serving as:  (1) a distributed system operator;354 (2) an integrated 
resource planner for both large-scale distributed energy resources, and 
storage; (3) a provider of reliability and standby power to customers; and (4) 
an energy services provider and financier, through rates, of such things as 
energy efficiency retrofits, energy control systems, DG, storage, and the 
like.355 
As new technologies and new strategies develop, the utility of the 
future must integrate them into its portfolio and into its rate designs.  
Strategic investments as well as strategic partnerships will be necessary 
components of utilities’ new business model.  Investments in distributed 
generation such as fuel cells356 or rooftop solar—as examples—can in some 
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instances produce greater efficiency, and in both instances reduce carbon 
emissions.357  Companies such as Bloomenergy358 and FuelCell Energy359 are 
actively in the market constructing fuel cells on-site as well as developing 
them for traditional IOUs and these are partnership opportunities.360  Fuel 
cells can achieve greater efficiencies and, as their costs decline, they become 
cost competitive in the current electricity market.361  Similarly, rooftop solar 
offers a low carbon alternative to baseload power and it is being offered by 
such companies such as Solar City that finance, install, and maintain the 
systems at a lower cost to the owner than traditional utility service under 
long-term power purchase agreements.362  This type of financial 
intermediation could also be adopted by the traditional IOU.363 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Thus, to succeed in the new electricity market, IOUs should adopt 
leadership roles by:  (1) developing a plan for technological deployment and 
including DG;364 (2) engaging in strategic investments in fuel cells and in 
rooftop solar; (3) providing financial assistance to customers who wish to 
invest in alternative technologies and in energy efficiency; (4) assisting 
regulators in designing new rate structures; and (5) partnering with other 
vendors, utilities, and a variety of investors to engage all of these, and other, 
innovative and creative activities.365 
As such, the new utility will be proactively responding to a new 
business environment.  Utilities, however, cannot and will not act on their 
                                                                                                                   
more efficient than conventional heat engine approaches.  CO2 is reduced, due to 
the high efficiency of the fuel cell, and the absence of combustion avoids the 
production of NOx and particulate pollutants. 
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357. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17. 
358. BLOOMENERGY, http://www.bloomenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30, 
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359. FUELCELL ENERGY, http://www.fuelcellenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
360. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 18, 20; Scott Hempling, 
Protecting Innovation During Consolidation:  The Advantages of Alertness, 
SCOTTHEMPLINGLAW.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/essays/protecting-
innovation. 
361. See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17–18. 
362. Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://www.solarcity.com/
residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see also SUNGEVITY, http://www.sungevity.com (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
363. Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17. 
364. See, e.g., Jolly et al., supra note 215, at 35. 
365. Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 20; see also CHANNELL ET AL., 
supra note 50, at 77. 
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own.  They must be aided and abetted by regulators who adopt new rules for 
their relationship with utilities that they regulate.  Those new rules will be 
sensitive to the new market, sensitive to the demands of customers, and 
sensitive to the needs of utilities.  The sensitivities are not only responsive to 
changing market conditions, they are responsive to a fundamental change in 
energy and electricity policy.  The traditional fossil fuel policy is no longer 
viable.  The future demands a clean energy economy and smart IOUs can 
play a transformative role.  The clean energy future will increase their 
reliance on renewable resources and energy efficiency, thus increasing the 
diversity of inputs into electricity generation.  In addition, the clean energy 
future should encourage competition, consumer choice, and technological 
innovation, as well as economic growth.  Although the challenges are real, 
the direction of the future should be clear.  IOUs can, then, play a leading 
role in building out the DG world. 
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